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The effects of the Morocco-European Union open skies agreement: A 
difference-in-differences analysis 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Air traffic relations between countries are typically regulated by bilateral agreements. 
Such agreements usually regulate the number of carriers a country is allowed to 
designate and the number of flights and routes flown, while they place restrictions on 
both fares and on carriers continuing flights to third-country markets. However, air 
services within the European Union (EU) have been fully liberalized since 1997, 
following the introduction of several legislation packages promoted by the European 
Commission aimed at increasing competition in the EU airline market.  
Additionally, various open skies agreements have been promoted by the European 
Commission over the last decade with several non-EU countries within the framework 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The main goal of the ENP is to increase 
economic integration between the EU and its southern and eastern neighbours, all of 
which are considered by the World Bank as middle-income developing countries (with 
the exception of Israel).  
In this paper we use the open skies agreement (OSA) signed between the EU and 
Morocco in December 2006 to identify the effects of the liberalization of the air 
transport market in a middle-income developing country. We identify two specific 
aspects of the impact of the Morocco-EU OSA on Morocco’s air traffic. First, we 
identify the effect of the agreement on the number of seats offered on pre-existing 
routes. Second, we identify the effect of the deregulation on the probability of new 
routes being opened up between the participant countries.  
We use data at the route level for the period 2003-2010 between North African and 
European countries. We exploit the fact that Morocco was the only country in North 
Africa to sign such an agreement and that the pre-liberalization traffic of all North 
African countries presented a common trend. Our empirical assessment of the effects of 
the Morocco-EU OSA is made by comparing changes in traffic volume and changes in 
the number of routes operated between Morocco and European countries with the 
corresponding changes for the rest of the North African countries and the EU following 
market liberalization.  
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Several econometric papers have examined the liberalization of international 
passenger aviation services.1 Most focus on the United States, which has signed several 
OSAs with countries from around the world since the early nineties. Micco and 
Serebrisky (2006) found that OSAs reduce air transport costs by 9% and increase the 
share of imports arriving by air by 7%. However, these results only hold for developed 
and upper middle-income developing countries. Whalen (2007) found a modest increase 
in fares on routes between the United States and Europe affected by the OSAs, while all 
the capacity expansion was undertaken by carriers on routes between their hubs. Using 
data from Northeast Asia to the United States, Zou et al. (2012) found that the lower 
airfares associated with an open-skies agreement may be counterbalanced by the mutual 
forbearance strategy promoted by airlines competing in multiple markets. Finally, 
Cristea et al. (2014) found air traffic to be 17% higher in liberalized markets than in 
still-regulated markets, while OSAs led to an aggregate decline of 14.4% in quality-
adjusted prices.  
Evidence of the impact of OSAs outside the US is scarce, given data availability 
restrictions, especially regarding fares.2  Previous studies have generally used cross-
sectional data and their main variable of interest has been the Air Liberalization Index 
(ALI) scores computed by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Piermartini and 
Rousová (2013) found that OSAs increased passenger traffic by 5%, using worldwide 
data from nearly 2,300 country-pairs for 2005. Cristea et al. (2015) performed a similar 
analysis with data for 2010 by combining country-pair data and city-pair data. Their 
results suggest that a one-unit increase in the ALI leads to a 1.8% increase in the 
number of air passengers and that more liberal agreements are associated with more 
city-pairs being served by direct flights. Ismaila et al. (2014) also found a positive and 
statistically significant effect of liberalization on passenger flows using a sample that 
included 112 country-pairs with Nigeria for 2010. Specifically, a one-unit increase in 
the ALI raised the level of traffic demand by 8.76%. Finally, some studies have found a 
                                                          
1 Some studies use analytical or computational models to examine the welfare effects of air transport 
liberalization policies (Adler et al., 2014; Gillen et al., 2002). Here we focus the attention on studies that 
follow an econometric approach as it is the one used in this paper.  
2 Various papers have examined the impact of deregulation within the European airline market. Marin 
(1995) investigated the impact of liberal bilateral agreements on a set of 35 European routes for the period 
1982-1989 and found that bilateral agreements lead to greater competition both in terms of prices and 
frequencies. Schipper et al. (2002) used a sample of 34 European routes with varying degrees of 
liberalization for the period 1988 to 1992 and found that fares are lower and frequencies are higher on 
fully liberalized routes. However, the high level of economic integration between the countries of the EU 
mean these studies were conducted in a very different context to the one examined here.   
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substantial positive impact on traffic flows in Canada due to more liberal bilateral 
agreements using country-pair panel data (Dresner and Oum, 1998; Clougherty et al., 
2001).  
We add to this literature by examining the impact of a specific multilateral OSA with 
a middle-income developing country. Furthermore, we employ a methodology in a 
treatment evaluation framework that compares changes between comparable treated and 
control routes. We check the robustness of our results to differences in the pre-existing 
characteristics of the treated and control groups by applying a matching procedure.  
Previous studies of US international routes have either focused on bilateral 
agreements while mixing data for developed and developing countries (Micco and 
Serebrisky, 2006; Cristea et al., 2014) or they have focused on high-income countries or 
dense routes (Whalen, 2007). Studies providing wide coverage use data for just one year 
so that they are only able to identity traffic differences between country-pairs or city-
pairs subject to different degrees of liberalization (Cristea et al., 2015; Piermartini and 
Rousová, 2013).  
In contrast, we are able to examine the change per se in the regulation regime using 
the logic of the difference-in-differences approach as we work with data before and 
after the OSA was signed between Morocco and the EU, and we conduct our 
comparison by focusing on similar routes operated by neighbouring countries that were 
not affected by the liberalization agreement. Furthermore, we do not only analyse 
changes in existing routes but also, in line with Cristea et al. (2014, 2015), changes in 
the probability of new routes being opened up.  
Finally, as we have access to data on the market structure at the route level, we are 
able to determine whether the change in the number of seats offered following the 
signing of the OSA is related solely to greater competition resulting from new market 
entrants and/or to the removal of restrictions imposed on incumbent airlines. In this 
regard, the impact of the OSA between the European Union and Morocco may be 
strongly influenced by the entry of low-cost airlines as, in contrast to previous studies, 
our analysis focuses on short-haul or medium-haul routes. In this regard, some few 
works have analyzed the impact of low-cost airlines on traffic at the route level with 
contradictory results (Bettini and Oliveira, 2008; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; Fageda, 
2014).  Here, we may provide new insights about the impact of low-cost airlines on 
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route traffic as their entry in the Morocco market was restricted in the pre-liberalization 
period. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the 
policy context of the OSA between the European Union and Morocco and describe the 
sample and data used in the empirical analysis. We then explain the empirical strategy, 
present the results of the analysis and perform some robustness checks. The last section 
is devoted to the concluding remarks.  
 
2. Policy context and data 
 
OSAs lie at the heart of the EU’s external aviation policy that seeks the creation of a 
Common Aviation Area with the EU’s neighbours. This strategy forms part of the 
broader European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which aims at achieving the greatest 
possible degree of economic integration between the EU and its southern and eastern 
neighbours.3 
Against this backdrop, the Moroccan government introduced a new tourist master 
plan known as Vision 2010, later updated and renamed Vision 2020 (Dobruszkes and 
Mondou, 2013). As part of this plan, the Moroccan government explicitly sought to 
liberalize international air transport so as to obtain lower airfares and to open up new 
routes. This objective to promote tourism, together with the ENP driven by the EU, led 
Morocco and the EU to sign an OSA on 12 December 2006. 
This agreement means that any EU or Moroccan airline can operate any route 
between any EU airport and any Moroccan airport and that they are free to set the flight 
frequencies, capacities and fares. Additionally, the Moroccan airlines are authorized to 
carry traffic between any EU airports if these services originate or terminate in 
Morocco, while the EU airlines are authorized to carry traffic between any Moroccan 
airport and an airport located beyond, provided that these services originate or terminate 
in the EU and that these points are located in the countries of the ENP. The agreement 
                                                          
3 Of the 16 ENP countries, 12 participate as full partners in the ENP and have agreed to ENP action plans. 
They are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, 
Tunisia and Ukraine. Algeria is currently negotiating an ENP action plan, while Belarus, Libya and Syria 
remain outside most of the structures of ENP. All these countries are classified by the World Bank as 
upper middle-income or lower middle-income countries with the exception of Israel which is classified as 
a high-income country. Other countries in North Africa, including Mauritania and Sudan, are also 
classified as lower middle-income countries.  
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also means the adaptation of aviation legislation in Morocco to EU rules and regulations 
on safety, competition laws, air traffic management and consumer protection. 4  
Prior to the signing of the OSA, air services between Morocco and European 
countries were regulated by bilateral agreements, none of which were especially liberal. 
The Air Liberalization Index (ALI), the standard indicator of liberalization in the air 
services between country-pairs, is based on several features embodied in these 
agreements, including traffic rights, flexibility in the setting of prices and capacity, 
designation of airlines and other elements. The standard ALI runs from 0 to 50, with 
agreements scoring 50 being deemed the most liberal. The ALI scores for most of the 
bilateral agreements between Morocco and the largest European countries ranged 
between 10 and 14 before the OSA.5 Hence, this multilateral agreement ushered in 
major changes in the level of regulation in air transport between the countries involved.  
We have worldwide data on the number of seats offered by airlines for 2002-2015 at 
the airport-pair level. These data are provided by RDC aviation (capstats statistics). 
However, we restrict our analysis to the period 2003-2010 and to routes originating in 
airports of North African countries (Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and 
Libya) and terminating in the airports of EU-15 countries plus Norway and Switzerland. 
This restricted sample seeks to avoid shocks other than the OSA that might distort the 
identification of the effects of the latter. Data after 2010 may be affected by the political 
conflicts associated with the Arab Spring, which has had a differential impact on the 
North African countries in our sample. We select 2003 to guarantee the symmetry of the 
periods before and after the signing of the OSA. We also exclude the European 
countries that have acceded to the European Union in the middle of this period, while 
we opt to focus on North African countries as these are the most similar to Morocco, at 
least in geographical terms.  
Overall, our sample of pre-existing routes (routes with air services in each of the 
years in the period under consideration) includes 191 routes and 1,501 observations. 
Routes originating in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia represent about 95% of the 
                                                          
4 Neighbouring countries that have benefited from an open skies agreement with the EU are Georgia 
(2011), Israel (2013), Jordan (2010) and Morocco (2006). As for relations with other neighbouring 
countries, negotiations are on-going with Lebanon, Tunisia and Azerbaijan. In a different context, the 
European Union has also signed OSAs with Canada (2009) and the United States (2008).  
5According to data provided by the WTO, in 2006 the ALI scores for Morocco and the countries of 
Europe were as follows: United Kingdom (14), Germany (12), France and Portugal (11), Belgium, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg (10), Spain (8), Italy (6), Austria (4) and Sweden (0).  
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total number of observations, which means the few routes originating in Mauritania, 
Libya and Sudan should have a very modest effect on our results. We also construct an 
additional sample comprising potential routes, defined as a link between all the airports 
in our sample of North African countries to all the airports in our sample of European 
countries.  This expanded sample includes 3,895 routes and 31,160 observations. Again, 
most of the observations are for the countries identified above in the sample of pre-
existing routes.  
We consider the airports of the North African countries as being the origin and the 
airports of Europe as being the destination. Note that the supply between both directions 
of a route is identical (at least in the context of this analysis), so that the supply, for 
example, of the Marseille-Casablanca link is the same as that of the Casablanca-
Marseille link. 
We expect an increase in the number of seats offered on pre-existing routes and an 
increase in the probability of new routes being opened up due to the liberalization 
ushered in by the OSA. In a regulated context, incumbent airlines may face capacity 
restrictions on the routes they operate. Furthermore, they may face restrictions in terms 
of fare setting, which could condition their profitability. Holding the level of 
competition on the route constant, the OSA may lead to an increase in the number of 
seats offered by incumbent airlines because of the lifting of regulations on capacities 
and fares. They may also adopt a pre-emption strategy, which would involve increasing 
the capacity on a route so as to impose entry barriers on new entrants once market 
access is no longer regulated.  
Another expected effect of the OSA is the entry of new airlines on the routes 
affected, including the entry of low-cost airlines or airlines other than the traditional 
incumbent airlines (e.g., the former flag carriers). We expect the deregulation to be 
associated with greater levels of competition, which it may lead to a higher number of 
seats offered. Additionally, the lifting of restrictions to operate on specific routes should 
also lead to an increase in the number of routes operated. In the regulated context, the 
former flag carriers tended to monopolize the market and may have been obliged to 
operate specific routes. With liberalization, a number of new routes might be operated 
by airlines that have lower costs than those incurred by traditional carriers or the 
traditional carriers may face fewer restrictions when choosing their route network.  
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Table 1 shows the descriptive data of the air services supply between the North 
African and European countries in our sample for the first and last years of the period 
being analysed. Morocco is the North African country with the highest increase both in 
the number of seats and in the number of routes offered. This increase in the number of 
seats and routes seems to be attributable mainly to the low-cost airlines, as their share 
increased substantially over the period at the expense of that of the former flag carriers. 
This is in line with the analysis undertaken by Dobruskes et al. (2016), who report a 
marked increase in traffic in Morocco after 2006 due to the penetration of the low-cost 
airlines.  Egypt and Tunisia seem to have followed a similar trend although at a slower 
pace. In contrast, the increase in traffic in Algeria does not appear to have been at the 
expense of the former flag carriers, and the country even reports a reduction in the 
number of routes offered. The increase in traffic in Libya is also notable, but it is 
entirely attributable to the former flag carriers. Finally, Mauritania and Sudan contribute 
just two and three routes, respectively, to the analysis. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
While this table provides descriptive evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
Morocco has benefitted from the OSA, a multivariate econometric analysis using data at 
the route level is needed to conclude that the agreement has had a significant and 
differential impact on air traffic between Morocco and Europe. This analysis is reported 
in the following sections.  
 
3. Empirical Strategy  
 
As mentioned above, we identify two specific aspects of the impact of the EU-Morocco 
OSA on Morocco’s air traffic. First, we identify the effect of the agreement on the 
number of seats offered on pre-existing routes. Second, we identify the effect of the 
deregulation on the probability of new routes being opened up between participant 
countries.  
To identify these two effects, we exploit the experimental environment created by 
the change in regulations between the EU and Morocco, and the fact that no changes 
occurred in the regulations between the EU and the other North African countries or 
between Morocco and the other non-EU European countries.  
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Thus, in addressing the first of these effects, we estimate the impact of the 
agreement on the number of seats offered on routes affected by the change in regulation, 
using as a counterfactual the number of seats offered on routes between the other North 
African countries and the EU, and, between Morocco and the other non-EU European 
countries. Specifically, we assess this impact by comparing the change in the number of 
seats offered on routes affected by the OSA with the change in the number of seats 
offered on routes that remained unaffected. By comparing these changes, we control for 
both observable and unobservable differences between routes that are invariant in time.  
Our treated routes are all the routes operated between Morocco and EU member 
countries before the agreement, while our control routes are all the routes operated 
between the other North African countries and EU members, and, all the routes operated 
between Morocco and non-EU European countries prior to the agreement. 6 In this way, 
we control for the evolution in the number of seats out of Morocco before the OSA and 
the evolution in the number of flights out of Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Sudan 
and Libya to the same EU countries, and the flights from Morocco to Switzerland and 
Norway. To do so, we estimate the following model: 
 
log⁡(𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 =⁡𝛽0 +⁡𝛽1treated𝑖 +⁡𝛽2after𝑡 +⁡𝛽3𝑂𝑆𝐴𝑖 +⁡𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 +⁡𝜇𝑡 +⁡𝜀𝑖𝑡⁡         <1> 
 
where our dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of seats offered on route i 
in period t; treated is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when route i connects 
Morocco with one of the EU member states; after is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 from 2007 onwards; OSA is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when 
route i connects Morocco with a EU member state from 2007 onwards; X is a vector of 
control variables based on route or endpoint features; 𝜇𝑡 are year dummies; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is 
the error term. We consider 2007 as the first year in which the agreement was in force, 
given that it was signed in mid-December 2006.  
The vector of controls includes different variables that might influence the number 
of seats offered on a route. Here, we include the standard variables used in gravity 
models, assuming that the air traffic between two points depends positively on the 
economic and demographic size of these points and negatively on distance.  
                                                          
6 We consider all routes that were served by at least one flight per week in the two years prior to the OSA.  
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Hence, we first include the distance between the points of origin and destination of 
route i as our explanatory variable. The data for this variable are provided by RDC 
aviation. Given that most of the routes in our sample are not strongly affected by 
competition from other transportation modes (neither trains nor coaches), we expect a 
negative sign for the coefficient associated with this variable, as demand between two 
points is negatively related to distance.  
Second, we control for the population of the cities of origin and destination. Here, 
bigger cities are expected to have a larger supply of seats, given that the increase in 
population increases the number of people wanting to fly, understood that the 
proportion of people who travel by plane remains constant within the total population. 
The data for this variable are expressed at the urban level. For cities with more than 
300,000 inhabitants, information is obtained from the United Stations (World 
Urbanization Prospects). The data for smaller cities are obtained from the National 
Statistics Agency of the corresponding country.  
Third, we control for the economic status of the countries of origin and destination 
using the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, on the understanding that demand 
between richer endpoints should be higher. Furthermore, we include a variable that 
measures the degree of openness of the origin and destination countries which is 
measured as the percentage of imports and exports over GDP. The data for these 
variables are expressed at the country level and are obtained from the World Bank 
(World Development Indicators). Unfortunately, data at a more disaggregated level are 
only available for European countries.  
We also include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the route connects an 
EU country with a former colony. This is the case for routes that link airports from 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to France, routes from Egypt to United Kingdom and 
routes from Libya to Italy. We expect a higher demand on these routes given the strong 
links associated with colonization. Furthermore, we include a dummy variable that takes 
a value of 1 for tourist destinations in North Africa where the population of the main 
city or town is very small. We expect demand on these routes to be higher than the 
control variables of population or income per capita might suggest. Note also that air 
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traffic on these routes should be essentially from European cities to the tourist 
destinations.7    
Finally, we include two variables that control for the degree of competition in the 
route: one, the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration Index (HHI); the other, the share of 
network carriers in the route considering network carriers former flag carriers and 
airlines involved in international alliances in the considered period.8 They are both 
measured in terms of the number of seats offered on the route. Note that the HHI 
variable is strongly correlated with the share of network carriers on a route so that a 
reduction in this index is essentially associated with the entry of low-cost airlines or 
other non-network airlines. Hence, both variables are highly correlated.  
We estimate four specifications of equation (1) that are differentiated by controlling 
or not for the competition variables. In the first specification, we consider both HHI and 
share of network carrier as explanatory variables. In the second specification, we do not 
control for the share of network carriers. In the third specification, we do not control for 
the HHI. In the last specification, we do not control for any of the competition variables.  
These different specifications allow us to untangle whether the OSA has an effect 
on the number of seats offered on a route while holding the level of competition 
constant or whether, on the contrary, the OSA affects the number of seats offered as a 
result of the greater competition on the route.  
Recall that the increase in the number of seats due to deregulation may be related to 
the lifting of the restrictions imposed on incumbent airlines so that they are free to fix 
capacities and fares or may reflect a pre-emption strategy whereby they seek to impede 
the entry of new airlines. If this were the case, the impact of the OSA would be relevant 
even when holding the degree of competition on the route constant. In contrast, the 
impact of the OSA could be exclusively related to the greater competition resulting 
from the operation of new airlines on the previously regulated routes. In this case, the 
effect of the OSA should only be relevant when we do not control for the competition 
variables.  
                                                          
7 These tourist destinations are Djerba, Enfidha, Monastir, Tabarka and Tozeur in Tunisia, Hurghada, 
Luxor, Marsa Alam and Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt and Essaouira in Morocco. Other major tourist 
destinations like Marrakech, Fez or Cairo are also big or medium-sized cities. 
8 Network carriers with flights in our sample are: Aegean airlines, Aer Lingus, Air Algerie, Air Europa, 
Air France, Air Mauritania, Alitalia, Austrian airlines, Brussels airlines, Egyptair, Iberia, KLM, Libyan 
airlines, Lufthansa, Luxair, Olympic airlines, Portugalia, Royal Air Maroc, SAS, Spanair, Sudan Airways, 
Swiss, Swissair, TAP, Tunisair. 
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Another potential explanatory factor for which we cannot control in our model is 
fares, given the lack of data. In this respect, airline behaviour can be considered as a 
multistage process (Marín, 1995; Schipper et al., 2002; Winston and Yan, 2015). In the 
first stage, airlines choose whether to enter the market or not; in the second stage, and 
having entered the market, they decide on the capacity they wish to offer. In the third 
stage, the airlines set prices, which makes them the most flexible variable. Hence, our 
analysis here considers the first two stages of the airlines’ decision-making process.  
All (continuous) control variables are expressed in logarithms as is usual in gravity 
models. The year dummies allow us to control for yearly shocks, which are common to 
all routes. In the same sense, the dummies treated and after allow us to control for 
differences between groups and between periods (before and after the agreement), 
respectively.   
The estimate of interest here is⁡𝛽3, which represents the difference-in-differences 
effect of the OSA on the number of seats offered. The key identification assumption of 
the difference-in-differences approach is that the variable of interest would have 
followed a parallel trend in the absence of deregulation in both the treated and control 
groups (Meyer, 1995). Hence, the evolution in the number of seats in the control group 
represents a suitable estimate of the evolution of the number of seats in the treated 
group in the absence of deregulation.  
As this assumption is not testable, we provide evidence that the treated and control 
groups followed parallel trends before the OSA was signed. Thus, first, we perform an 
equality of means test of the seats offered on the treated and control routes on a yearly 
basis. The results are shown in Figure 1. The null hypothesis of equality of means 
between control and treated groups cannot be rejected for all years of the pre-reform 
period. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
Second, to identify the effect of the OSA on the probability of new routes being 
opened up we estimate the following model: 
𝑃(𝐴𝑖𝑟⁡𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 =⁡𝛼0 + 𝛼1treated𝑖 +⁡𝛼2after𝑡 +⁡𝛼3𝑂𝑆𝐴𝑖 +⁡𝛼4𝑋𝑖𝑡 +⁡𝛿𝑡 +⁡𝛾𝑖𝑡    
<2> 
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where the dependent variable in this estimation is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 when the route has air services. We consider that a route has air services 
when an airline offers at least one flight per week. The control variables are the same as 
in equation 1 and their expected signs are the same, since all these variables are demand 
shifters. The only variables not to be included in equation 2 are the competition 
variables since they cannot be computed for routes with no air services.  
Recall that we estimate the effect of the OSA by comparing changes in the dependent 
variable in the treated and control groups. In this case, we compare the changes in the 
probability of the opening up of new routes between Morocco and the EU countries 
participating in the OSA with the changes in the probability of the opening up of new 
routes between the other North African countries and the EU, and, between Morocco 
and non-EU European countries.  
Our estimate of interest in this case is 𝛼3 , which represents the difference-in-
differences effect of the OSA on the probability of the opening up of new routes. The 
key identifying assumption in this case also holds: Figure 2 presents the equality of 
means test between the treated and control groups on a yearly basis. The results show 
that until 2006 we cannot reject the hypothesis that the probability of opening up new 
routes is equal on treated and on control routes. In 2006, however, the probability 
increases on those routes affected by the OSA. This can be attributed to the effects of 
the agreement itself: although it was not signed until December of that year, the airlines 
might have reacted to it earlier. In this respect, some informal liberalization of air travel 
regulations between two countries may have occurred prior to the formalisation of the 
OSA. Thus, our estimate of the effect of the agreement might be an underestimation, as 
this difference in 2006 is captured for the variable treated but not for the OSA itself.  
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
Note that results of the analysis may be affected by the presence of differences in the 
pre-existing characteristics of the treated and control groups. Tables 2 and 3 show the 
mean test differences for all the control variables. Furthermore, we also provide the 
mean test differences for the previous level of liberalization (as measured by the ALI 
index). Table 2 shows the differences in the sample of pre-existing routes, while Table 3 
shows the differences in the sample of all potential routes. In the first sample, we find 
differences for the income per capita and openness at the point of origin, for the dummy 
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for tourist destinations and for the ALI index. In the second sample, we find differences 
for all the variables considered except population and openness at the point of 
destination. Hence, at the end of the following section we apply a matching procedure 
and we re-estimate equations 1 and 2 with the observations that have common support 
as a robustness check.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
4. Estimation and results  
In this section, we deal with a number of econometric issues and discuss the results of 
the regressions. The estimates may present heteroscedasticity and temporal and cross-
sectional autocorrelation problems. We apply the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test 
for heteroscedasticity and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. Both 
tests show that we may have a problem of heteroscedasticity (in some regressions) and 
autocorrelation, which must be addressed. Hence, the standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we allow for an arbitrary variance-
covariance structure by computing the standard errors in clusters by route to correct for 
autocorrelation in the error term both at the cross-sectional and temporal levels. 
The data used present a panel structure so that we need to use the techniques 
typically applied within the framework of panel data models. In this regard, a clear 
advantage of the fixed effects model is that it allows us to control for omitted variables 
that are correlated with the variables of interest and which do not change over time. 
Hence, the fixed effects model is more reliable than other techniques. However, the 
fixed effect model focuses on the within variation of data and so it cannot capture the 
effect of time invariant variables, such as distance or the dummies for colonial links and 
tourist destinations. Hence, we also show the regressions using a pooled model that 
allows us to examine the influence of these time invariant variables.  
Another problem that we must address is the potential endogeneity bias of the HHI 
variable (in those regressions in which it is included). As our instrument, we use the 
concentration index for the two airports on the route. This variable is constructed as 
follows: we calculate the HHI index in terms of the number of airline seats both at the 
origin and destination airports on the route. Then, we obtain the mean value of the HHI 
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index for both airports on the route. Airline decisions at the airport level refer to all the 
routes leaving from a given airport, so we would expect this variable to be exogenous 
and correlated with the HHI at the route level.  
Table 4 shows the results of the equation for the number of seats offered on pre-
existing routes. In columns 1-2, we present the results when including both competition 
variables as explanatory variables. In columns 3-4, we present the results when the 
variable for the share of network carriers is excluded. In columns 5-6, we exclude the 
HHI index. In the last two columns, both competition variables are excluded.  
We find that the Morocco-EU OSA does not have a statistically significant effect on 
the number of seats offered when we control for the competition variables (except when 
we use the pooled model that just consider the share of network carriers as explanatory 
variable for competition). In contrast, the impact of the OSA is substantial when we do 
not control for the degree of competition on the route. This result remains the same 
regardless of the estimation technique used.  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
In terms of magnitude, the increase in the number of seats offered on the treated 
routes after the signing of the OSA is about 24% higher than that on the control routes 
when using the route fixed effects method, which is our preferred approach. Thus, we 
find clear evidence of the fact that the OSA has had a notable impact on the market. 
This impact is essentially related to stronger market competition due to the entry of non-
network carriers and not to a change in the behaviour of the incumbent airlines.  
The magnitude of the impact of the OSA is higher than that reported in similar 
studies conducted to date. Cristea et al. (2015) performed a counterfactual analysis 
based on their empirical results that suggests that a move to a more liberal environment 
in the Middle East could lead to an increase in traffic flows of between 7 and 18%, 
while the results of Piermartini and Rousová (2013) suggest that OSAs could increase 
worldwide passenger traffic by 5%.  
A possible explanation for the more marked impact reported herein might be that the 
OSA analysed here means that Morocco, to all intents and purposes, forms part of the 
de-regulated European airline market with its significant presence of low-cost airlines. 
Indeed, the downward pricing pressure that low-cost airlines exert on the routes they 
operate is well documented in the literature (e.g., Morrison, 2001; Goolsbee and 
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Syverson, 2008; Hofer et al., 2008; Oliveira and Huse, 2009). Thus, it would appear that 
the OSA has had a notable impact on fares (and hence on capacity) precisely because of 
the entry of low-cost airlines.  
Additionally, the potential increase in traffic may be greater when one of the 
countries party to the agreement is a middle-income developing country. In this regard, 
the results from our analysis differ from those obtained by Micco and Serebrinsky 
(2006). The latter failed to find a significant impact of OSAs on air transport costs when 
considering lower middle-income developing countries, such as Morocco. A possible 
explanation for this is that Micco and Serebrinsky (2006) focused on cargo markets 
while our analysis focuses on passenger markets.  
The results for the control variables seem to work better in the pooled model than 
they do in the fixed effects model. Recall that the fixed effects model concentrates on 
the within-variation of data and the fixed effects may already capture the impact related 
to bigger cities and richer countries. In any case, the results for the main variable of 
interest are very similar regardless of the technique used. What is notable is that we do 
not find a statistically significant effect of the distance variable; however, this result 
may be explained by the fact that the range of distances for the routes in our sample is 
not great.  
Table 5 shows the results for the probability of the opening up of new routes. Here, 
we find a positive impact of the OSA. For a route affected by the OSA, the odds of 
having a service are about 1.5-3.5 greater than the odds for a route unaffected by the 
OSA. The only paper to conduct a similar analysis is that of Cristea et al. (2015). In 
their counterfactual analysis for the Middle East, they find that a fully liberalized 
environment would increase the odds of a flight between any two given cities by a 
factor of 1.2–1.4. Again, the results of our analysis report an even stronger impact of the 
OSA between Morocco and EU. In this regard, Dobruskes and Mondou (2013) provide 
data in which they show that liberalization in Morocco has benefited regional airports at 
the expense of the economic (Casablanca) and political capitals (Rabat). Note that low-
cost airlines, such as Ryanair and Easyjet, which have enjoyed a notorious presence in 
the Moroccan market since liberalization, do not necessarily operate at the largest 
airports.  
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As in the previous regression, the control variables work better in the pooled 
regression than in the fixed effects regression. The estimated effect for the main variable 
of interest is higher when we use the fixed effects model but it is high in both cases.   
<Insert Table 5 here> 
We check the robustness of our results to potential differences in the pre-existing 
characteristics of the treated and control groups. Essentially, we wish to eliminate any 
concerns that the evolution in the respective number of seats offered and the respective 
probabilities of the opening up of a new route might have differed because of pre-
existing differences. For example, it might be that the number of seats offered on a route 
or the probability of a new route being opened is influenced by the income per capita of 
the countries involved or pre-existing levels of liberalization of air traffic in the two 
countries.   
To overcome this concern we apply matching procedures and re-estimate equations 1 
and 2 with the observations that have common support. Matching procedures eliminate 
the possible bias by pairing observations in the treated and control groups with similar 
characteristics. That is, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we first estimate the 
probability of being treated conditional on the pre-existing characteristics that differ 
between groups with a logistic model, obtaining the propensity score for each 
observation. In a second step, we match the observations in the treated and control 
groups with respect to the propensity score using the first nearest neighbour algorithm. 
This algorithm matches treated observations with the control that has the closest 
propensity score. Then, we drop all the observations without common support and re-
estimate equations 1 and 2.  
Recall that for our first question (that is, the effect of the OSA on the number of seats 
offered) the treated and control groups differed in terms of the income per capita and 
openness of the point of origin, the percentage of tourist routes and the degree of 
liberalization between the countries of origin and destination. Hence, to maintain only 
those observations with common support, we estimated the probability of being treated 
conditional on these features. After applying the first nearest neighbour algorithm we 
obtained a smaller sample comprising the treated and control groups that are closest 
with respect to the three pre-existing characteristics. Overall, the matching sample 
contains 53 routes from the treated group and 53 from the control group. The results for 
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the logistic regression and the mean difference between groups in the full and the 
matching samples are presented in the Appendix, in Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively.  
For our second question, (that is, the effect of the OSA on the probability of a new 
route being opened up), the treated and control groups differ in several characteristics, 
namely, the distance between the points of origin and destination, the level of 
population at origin, the income per capita at origin and destination, the openness at 
origin, the percentage of routes linking up a former colony, the percentage of routes 
considered as being tourist routes, and the pre-existing level of air liberalization 
between the countries. Here again, we estimated a logistic regression of the probability 
of being treated conditional on all quoted characteristics and include observations on 
common support using the first nearest neighbour algorithm. This sample contains 924 
treated and 924 control routes. Results for the logistic regression and the mean 
difference between groups in the full and the matching samples are presented in the 
Appendix, in Tables A.3 and A.4, respectively.  
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the regressions using the matching sample. Our 
results for these additional regressions confirm our previous findings. In fact, we find a 
stronger effect of the OSA between Morocco and the EU. The results for the fixed 
effects model indicate an increase of about 42% in the number of seats offered on the 
treated routes after the signing of the OSA. For a route affected by the OSA, the odds of 
having a service are about six times greater than the odds for a route unaffected by the 
OSA. Thus, the previous regressions that did not take into account the differences in 
pre-existing characteristics of treated and control groups underestimate the impact of the 
OSA between Morocco and EU.  
<Insert Table 6 here> 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
Finally, we perform a falsification test to check that the effects reported with regard 
to the number of seats and the probability of new routes being opened up could only be 
found when the OSA was in place. To do so, we first discard all treated routes from 
both samples and assign treatment randomly to the control routes. We assign treatment 
to randomly selected routes maintaining the same proportion between control and 
treated routes as in the original samples. Thus, we have 37 treated routes from the 139 
in the first estimation and 60 from the 193 in the second sample. As observed in Table 
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8, the results show that the OSA effect is not significant when applied to routes that 
have not actually been affected by the agreement.  
<Insert Table 8 here> 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have shown that the OSA signed between Morocco and EU has had 
a very marked impact on the air traffic services between the participant countries. We 
have found that the increase in the number of seats offered is about 20-40% on pre-
existing routes, while there has been a notable increase in the number of new routes 
offered, after controlling for the characteristics that might explain the probability of 
having air services.   
Given that the link between economic development and air traffic is well established 
in the literature, our results shed light on the importance of promoting policies that 
liberalize airline markets. In this regard, we provide evidence of the benefits that a 
liberalized environment may have for middle-income developing countries.  
Most previous studies likewise report positive effects of the liberalization of the 
airline market; however, our estimated magnitudes appear to be higher. It could be the 
case that the potential benefits of liberalization are stronger when one of the countries 
party to the agreement is not a high-income country. In addition, Morocco is 
geographically close to many European countries, which might have facilitated the entry 
of European low-cost airlines into this market. Indeed, our analysis suggests that the 
implementation of an OSA between the EU and other neighbouring countries may have 
strong positive effects in terms of generating more traffic on pre-existing routes and 
opening up more routes for operation.  
While we provide complementary evidence of the potential benefits of the 
liberalization of international air transport services, the practical advances in the policy 
arena are still somewhat limited. Significant progress towards a liberalized environment 
has been achieved in some parts of the world, for example, among the countries 
belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. However, the EU has signed 
OSAs with relatively few countries, while legacy airlines in the US (the most active 
country in terms of its involvement in OSAs) are bringing considerable pressure to bear 
on the government to cancel such agreements with countries in the Middle East.9 From 
                                                          
9 “Open-Skies Agreements Challenged”, New York Times, February 6, 2015. 
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a more general perspective, restrictive bilateral agreements continue to regulate the air 
services between most countries around the globe. Hence, the results of this study 
should be informative in guiding policies that seek to eliminate such regulations and 
which distort airline decisions concerning their route network, capacity and fares.  
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TABLE AND FIGURES  
 
Table 1. Data about air traffic between Morocco and the European sample 
countries 
Country Year 
Seats 
(millions) 
Number 
of routes 
Share flag 
carriers 
Share 
LCCs 
Share 
others HHI 
Algeria 2003 1.8 53 0.73 0.00 0.27 0.44 
Algeria 2010 2.7 49 0.62 0.00 0.37 0.33 
Egypt 2003 2.1 48 0.85 0.15 0.00 0.21 
Egypt 2010 3.1 72 0.47 0.46 0.07 0.09 
Lybia 2003 0.23 10 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.2 
Lybia 2010 0.57 14 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.24 
Mauritania 2003 0.05 3 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.5 
Mauritania 2010 0.03 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 
Morocco 2003 2.3 53 0.95 0.03 0.02 0.41 
Morocco 2010 4.7 129 0.49 0.49 0.02 0.21 
Sudan 2003 0.07 2 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 
Sudan 2010 0.02 2 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.5 
Tunisia 2003 1.7 56 0.87 0.11 0.03 0.39 
Tunisia 2010 2.3 75 0.68 0.28 0.04 0.25 
Notes: Flag carriers are Aer Lingus, Air Algerie, Air France, Air Mauritania, Alitalia, Austrian 
airlines, Brussels airlines, Egyptair, Iberia, KLM, Libyan airlines, Lufthansa, Luxair, Olympic 
airlines, Portugalia, Royal Air Maroc, SAS, Sudan Airways, Swiss, Swissair, TAP, Tunisair. Low 
cost are Air Arabia Maroc, Air Arabia Egypt, Air One, Air Berlin, Arkefly, Atlas Blue, Clickair, 
Condor, Corsair, Excel Airways, First Choice, Germanwings, HapagFly, Jet2, Jet4you, Jetairfly, 
LTU, Monarch, MyAir, MyTravelAirways, Niki, Norwegian, Nouvelair Tunisie, Primera Air 
Scandinavia, Ryanair, Thomas Cook, Thomsonfly, Transavia, TUI, Vueling, XL Airways. Other 
carriers are Aegean, Aeroflight, Aerolloyd, Afriqiyah Airways, Aigle Azur, Air Austral, Air 
Europa, Air Finland, Air Lib, Air Littoral, Antinea airlines, Belair, Binter Canarias, Bravo Air 
Congo, Edelweiss Air, Eurofly, HI Hamburg International, Regional airlines, Spanair, The number 
of routes refers to the total number of routes with air services with at least one flight per week.  
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Table 2. Mean test differences in characteristics of treated and control groups, 
offered seats sample. Year 2006 
Characteristic Treated Control Difference 
Distance 1787 (78) 1942 (82) 156 (141) 
Pop at origin 1758 (187) 2534 (395) 775 (649) 
Pop at destination 4045 (542) 3525 (306) -519 (597) 
GNI at origin 5130 (0) 9768 (377) 4638*** (609) 
GNI at destination 33907 (453) 34471 (309) 563 (573) 
HHI 0.765 (0.034) 0.731 (0.021) -0.0336 (0.0398) 
DEx-colony 0.434 (0.069) 0.38 (0.042) -0.0499 (0.079) 
DTourist 0.019 (0.019) 0.35 (0.04) 0.32*** (0.066) 
ALI 10.45 (0.26) 7.31 (0.44) -3.14*** (0.735) 
Share_network 0.56 (0.06) 0.48 (0.04) -0.07 (0.07) 
Openness at origin 73.9 (0) 77.3 (1.24) 3.43* (2) 
Open. at destination 72.6 (4.26) 71.9 (2.77) -0.65 (5.19) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).   
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Mean differences in characteristics of treated and control groups, 
probability of new routes sample. Year 2006 
Characteristic Treated Control Difference 
Distance 1960 (20) 2278 (21) 317*** (17) 
Pop at origin 814 (29) 1167 (49) 354*** (89) 
Pop at destination 1625 (76) 1559 (41) -66 (85) 
GNI at origin 5130 (0) 8981 (91) 3851*** (163) 
GNI at destination 34305 (125) 35271 (93) 965*** (181) 
DEx-colony 0.17 (0.012) 0.14 (0.006) -0.02* (0.012) 
DTourist 0.09 (0.009) 0.27 (0.008) 0.18*** (0.015) 
ALI 9.65 (0.11) 5.05 (0.087) -4.6*** (0.17) 
Openness at origin 73.88 (0) 75.9 (0.265) 2.04*** (0.46) 
Open. at destination 71.69 (1.13) 73.55 (0.62) 1.86 (1.28) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).   
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Table 4. Results of the estimates – Seats offered 
Dependent variable Log(number of seats) 
Method IV 
(Pooled) 
IV 
(Fixed 
effects) 
IV 
(Pooled) 
IV 
(Fixed 
effects) 
 
Pooled 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Pooled 
 
Fixed effects 
Competition 
variables 
ALL ALL HHI HHI Share_network Share_network None None 
DOpen_skies -0.0545 
(0.25) 
0.052 
(0.099) 
-0.078 
(0.16) 
0.036 
(0.1) 
0.178** 
(0.08) 
0.119 
(0.09) 
0.263*** 
(0.076) 
0.237*** 
(0.09) 
Controls         
Treated 0.018 
(0.47) 
- 0.046 
(0.14) 
- -0.374*** 
(0.14) - 
-0.299** 
(0.15) 
- 
After -0.052 
(0.37) 
-0.13 
(0.19) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
0.031 
(0.18) 
11.49* 
(4.8) 
0.41 
(0.31) 
- 0.48 
(0.33) 
Log(distance) 0.89 
(0.31) 
- 0.11 
(0.11) 
- -0.05 
(0.098) 
- -0.052 
(0.11) 
- 
Log(population at 
origin) 
0.375*** 
(0.135) 
0.76 
(1.3) 
0.366*** 
(0.04) 
0.83 
(1.24) 
0.371*** 
(0.026) 
1.26 
(1.36) 
0.347*** 
(0.03) 
1.378 
(1.5) 
Log(population at 
destination) 
0.263*** 
(0.07) 
6.07*** 
(2.25) 
0.258*** 
(0.044) 
6.15*** 
(2.17) 
0.333*** 
(0.03) 
6.37*** 
(2.24) 
0.346*** 
(0.04) 
6.305*** 
(2.4) 
Log(GNI at origin) -0.007 
(0.33) 
-1.56*** 
(0.76) 
0.007 
(0.15) 
-1.65** 
(0.71) 
-0.21 
(0.13) 
-1.795**  
(0.78) 
-0.091 
(0.13) 
-1.63* 
(0.84) 
Log(GNI at 
destination) 
0.75 
(2.4) 
0.49 
(0.81) 
0.902** 
(0.43) 
0.43 
(0.72) 
-0.45 
(0.54) 
-0.015 
(0.84) 
-0.018 
(0.56) 
-0.171 
(0.9) 
DTourist  0.4 
(0.36) 
- 0.37* 
(0.2) 
- 
 
0.418*** 
(0.12) 
- 0.499*** 
(0.13) 
 
DEx-colony 0.47 
(0.42) 
- 0.45*** 
(0.13) 
- 0.341*** 
(0.098) 
 0.11 
(0.12) 
 
Log(HHI) -1.18 
(4.4) 
-1.5* 
(0.87) 
-1.51** 
(0.76) 
-1.2*** 
(0.37) 
- - - - 
Share_network -0.15 
(2.34) 
0.27 
(0.46) 
- - -0.425*** 
(0.053) 
-0.48***  
(0.09) 
- - 
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Log(Op at origin) 0.33 
(1.05) 
-0.25 
(0.27) 
0.41 
(0.35) 
-0.27 
(0.26) 
0.08 
(0.12) 
-0.25 
(0.27) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
-0.19 
(0.28) 
Log(Op at destination) 0.009 
(0.23) 
0.78 
(0.66) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
0.85 
(0.61) 
0.197* 
(0.12) 
0.725 
(0.67) 
-0.018 
(0.12) 
0.4 
(0.72) 
Intercept -4.48 
(34.9) 
- -7.15* 
(4.3) 
- 
 
- - 6.98 
(5.1) 
-31.63 
(23.11) 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Joint sig. test 
 
R2 
 
Wooldridge test 
 
Breusch-Pagan / 
Cook-Weisberg test 
 
Number of ids 
 
Number observations 
25.75*** 
 
0.562 
 
23.88*** 
 
1.92 
 
 
191 
 
1501 
12.73*** 
 
0.187 
 
23.292*** 
 
16.48*** 
 
 
191 
 
1501 
20.56*** 
 
0.551 
 
23.2*** 
 
16.88*** 
 
 
191 
 
1501 
 
13.85*** 
 
0.251 
 
23.2*** 
 
8.12*** 
 
 
191 
 
1501 
210521.6*** 
 
0.985 
 
21.187*** 
 
2.02 
 
 
191 
 
1501 
12.38*** 
 
0.2127 
 
21.187*** 
 
18.22*** 
 
 
191 
 
1501 
938.02*** 
 
0.9845 
 
20.22*** 
 
6.6** 
 
 
191 
 
1501 
10.58*** 
 
0.2165 
 
20.22*** 
 
13.69*** 
 
 
191 
 
1501 
Notes: We apply an instrumental variables procedure (IV) when HHI is included as explanatory variable. Standard errors are in parenthesis. They are robust to 
heterocedasticity, and they are also clustered at the route level except in the pooled model where we assume an AR-1 process in the error term. Statistical 
significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).   
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Table 5. Results of the estimates –Probability of openness of new routes 
Dependent variable Dair_services 
Method Logit (pooled)  Logit (Fixed Effects) 
DOpen_skies 0.399*** (0.1) 1.297*** (0.464) 
Odds Ratio 1.49*** (0.15) 3.45*** (1.37) 
Controls   
Treated 0.365* (0.19) - 
After 0.132 (0.08) 0.39 (1.01) 
Log (Distance) -1.304*** (0.136) - 
Log (Population at origin) 0.888*** (0.067) 5.69 (4.9) 
Log (Population at 
destination) 
0.730*** (0.054) -16.1* (8.28) 
Log (GNI at origin) 0.19 (0.21) 10.25** (4.67) 
Log (GNI at destination) 0.835* (0.49) -9.156*** (3.04) 
DTourist  2.97*** (0.24) - 
DEx-colony 1.374*** (0.14) - 
Log (openness at origin) 0.755 (0.39) 3.181*** (1.09) 
Log (openness at destination) 1.277*** (0.19) 1.377 (2.6) 
Intercept -29.39*** (5.85) - 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
Joint significance test 
R2 
 
Wooldridge test 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test 
 
Number of ids 
 
Number observations 
519.37*** 
0.22 
 
78.979*** 
 
17819.92*** 
 
 
3895 
 
31160 
257.14*** 
- 
 
81.179*** 
 
10375.37*** 
 
 
299 
 
2392 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. They are robust to heterocedasticity and clustered at 
the route level in the pooled regression and applying bootstrap standard errors in the fixed 
effects regression. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).  In the fixed effects 
regression, 3596 groups (28768 observations) are dropped by Stata because the dependent 
variable has all positive or all negative outcomes.  
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Table 6. Results of the estimates – Seats offered: Matching sample 
Dependent variable Log(number of seats) 
Method IV 
(Pooled) 
IV 
(Fixed 
effects) 
IV 
(Pooled) 
IV 
(Fixed 
effects) 
 
Pooled 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Pooled 
 
Fixed effects 
DOpen_skies 0.157 
(0.52) 
0.027 
(0.24) 
-0.035 
(0.15) 
0.039 
(0.19) 
0.116 
(0.097) 
0.301** 
(0.124) 
0.202*** 
(0.09) 
0.428*** 
(0.12) 
Controls         
Treated -0.016 
(0.23) 
- -0.076 
(0.17) 
- -0.17 
(0.18) - 
-0.224 
(0.22) 
- 
After 0.273 
(0.47) 
-0.1 
(1.1) 
0.042 
(0.13) 
-0.021 
(0.63) 
9.01 
(9.4) 
-2.067*** 
(0.72) 
- -2.008** 
(0.85) 
Log(HHI) YES YES YES YES - - - - 
Share_network YES YES - - YES YES - - 
Intercept 26.56 
(54.58) 
- -1.96 
(6.9) 
- 
 
- -102.8*** 
(35.44) 
8.964 
(9.69) 
-107.1*** 
(37.95) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Joint sig. test 
 
R2 
 
Number of ids 
 
Number observations 
7.6*** 
 
0.98 
 
106 
 
836 
6.58*** 
 
0.17 
 
106 
 
836 
9.8*** 
 
0.995 
 
106 
 
836 
 
5.49*** 
 
0.2 
 
106 
 
836 
61258*** 
 
0.977 
 
106 
 
836 
5.65*** 
 
0.2099 
 
106 
 
836 
385.98*** 
 
0.979 
 
106 
 
836 
4.75*** 
 
0.2035 
 
106 
 
836 
Notes: We apply an instrumental variables procedure (IV) when HHI is included as explanatory variable. Standard errors are in parenthesis. They are robust to 
heterocedasticity, and they are also clustered at the route level except in the pooled model where we assume an AR-1 process in the error term. Statistical significance 
at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% 
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Table 7. Results of the estimates – Probability of openness: Matching sample 
Dependent variable Dair_services 
Method Logit (pooled model)  Logit (Fixed Effects) 
DOpen_skies 0.53*** (0.11) 1.896*** (0.73) 
Odds Ratio 1.67*** (0.19) 6.66*** (4.6) 
Controls   
Treated 0.13 (0.21) - 
After -0.173 (0.14) -1.13 (3.1) 
Log (Distance) -0.58*** (0.25) - 
Log (Population at 
origin) 0.996*** (0.12) 3.662 (5.34) 
Log (Population at 
destination) 0.635*** (0.07) -13.15 (11.76) 
Log (GNI at origin) 0.943** (0.44) 11.76 (14.84) 
Log (GNI at destination) 0.005 (0.83) -4.28 (4.14) 
DTourist  2.893*** (0.389) - 
DEx-colony 1.279*** (0.195) - 
Log (openness at origin) 1.180** (0.59) 3.746* (2.1) 
Log (openness at 
destination) 1.544*** (0.29) 2 (3.18) 
Intercept -29.5** (9.47) - 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
Joint significance test 
R2 
Number of ids 
Number observations 
236.95*** 
0.21 
1848 
14784 
93.58*** 
- 
155 
1240 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. They are robust to heterocedasticity and clustered 
at the route level in the pooled regression and applying bootstrap standard errors in the 
fixed effects regression. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).  In the fixed 
effects regression, 1629 routes (13032 observations) are dropped because the dependent 
variable has all positive or all negative outcomes.  
 
 
Table 8. Robustness checks: Falsification tests 
Dependent variable Log (seats) Probability of openness of new 
routes 
Method Pooled Fixed 
Effects 
Logit (pooled 
model) 
Logit (Fixed 
Effects) 
DOpen_skies -0.028 (0.068) -0.015 (0.08) 0.0098 (0.23) -0.017 (3.06) 
Treated -0.11 (0.077) - -0.27 (0.4) - 
After 13.28* (7.03) 0.796 (0.31) -0.09 (0.11) 1.5 (0.998) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Joint significance test 
 
R2 
 
Number of ids 
 
Number observations 
181321*** 
 
0.987 
 
138 
 
1085 
12.23*** 
 
0.167 
 
138 
 
1085 
359.7*** 
 
0.24 
 
2905 
 
23240 
71.55*** 
 
- 
 
193 
 
1544 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).   
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Figure 1. Mean differences in seats offered by period. Treated and control groups. 
 
Notes: The dot line divides periods in pre and post Openskies. The null 
hypothesis of equality of means between control and treated groups cannot be 
rejected for all years of the pre-reform period. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean differences in the probability of openness of new routes by period. 
Treated and control groups. 
 
Notes: The dot line divides periods in pre and post Open skies. The null 
hypothesis of equality of means between control and treated groups cannot be 
rejected for 2003-2005 pre-reform period. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Seats offered. Logistic regression. Matching Procedure 
Dependent variable Treated 
GNI at origin -0.0025*** (0.0005) 
DTourist  -2.2 (1.64) 
ALI 0.68 (0.23) 
Openness at origin -0.018 (0.05) 
Intercept 9.73*** (3.66) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical 
significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).   
 
 
Table A.2 Seats offered. Mean differences selected variables. Comparison between 
samples, year 2006 
 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 
5% (**), 10% (*).   
 
Table A.3 Probability of openness of new routes. Logistic regression. Matching 
Procedure 
Dependent variable Treated 
Distance -0.003***(0.0001) 
Pop at origin -0.0009*** (0.00008) 
GNI at origin -0.0015*** (0.00006) 
GNI at destination -0.00009*** (0.00001) 
Tourist -1.57***(0.23) 
Colonial -1.01*** (0.27) 
ALI 0.28*** (0.02) 
Op at origin -0.13***(0.009) 
Intercept 27.7*** (1.4) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical 
significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristic Whole sample Matching sample 
GNI at origin 4638*** (609) 2463*** (161) 
DTourist  0.32*** (0.066) 0.38*** (0.07) 
ALI -3.14*** (0.735) 1.04** (0.4) 
Openness at origin 2.04*** (0.46) 0.27 (2.2) 
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Table A.4 Probability of openness of new routes. Mean differences selected 
variables. Comparison between samples, year 2006. 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1% 
(***), 5% (**), 10% (*).   
Characteristic Whole sample Matching sample 
Distance 317*** (37) 123*** (45) 
Pop at origin 354*** (89) 62.2 (55.6) 
GNI at origin 3851*** (163) 2111*** (84) 
GNI at destination 965*** (181) -226 (199) 
Tourist 0.18*** (0.015) 0.27*** (0.018) 
Colonial -0.02* (0.012) -0.05 ***(0.017) 
ALI -3.14*** (0.735) -2.66*** (0.22) 
Op at origin 2.04***(0.46) 3.27*** (0.57) 
